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On November 9,1984, two farm lending cooperatives in 
Nebraska announced that they were freezing the stock 
that their borrowers must hold in them. Several years of 
low farm income had caused many of the co-ops' bor-
rowers to fall behind in their debt payments, and losses 
on these loans had depleted the co-ops' financial reserves. 
As a result, the co-ops had to suspend their normal 
procedures for buying back at its original price the stock of 
those who paid off their loans. Instead, the co-ops were to 
be liquidated, and the stockholders were eventually to 
receive their share of whatever assets remained after the 
co-ops' debts were paid. By December 1985, these 
liquidations still weren't complete, so stockholders still 
didn't know how much they will receive. 
Though the failed Nebraska co-ops were relatively 
small, their problems concerned farmers across the Unit-
ed States. The co-ops were two of hundreds of local farm 
lending cooperatives in the nationwide Farm Credit Sys-
tem (FCS), whose farm loan portfolio of over $60 bil-
lion makes it the nation's largest farm lender. The stock 
freeze at the two Nebraska co-ops thus reminded hun-
dreds of thousands of farmers who bought stock in FCS 
co-ops in order to borrow from them that this stock might 
be at risk. Furthermore, that risk may have seemed to be 
growing, because the farm depression largely responsible 
for the liquidations seemed to be worsening. The follow-
ing summer, in fact, the system's chief regulator publicly 
questioned whether the FCS, and thus the value of its 
stock, could be preserved without federal assistance 
(McCoy 1985b). 
The farmers' worries, in turn, aggravated the system's 
problems. Stories began circulating that fear of losses on 
their stock was causing farmers to try to pay off their co-
op loans early in order to redeem their stock at full price. 
Of course, this effort is most feasible for the system's 
financially strongest borrowers, those with the liquidity to 
finance themselves or the wealth and earning power to 
easily obtain financing from other lenders. The effect of 
such an exodus from the FCS would be a decline in both 
the size and quality of the system's already troubled loan 
portfolio. By some accounts, this exodus has been occur-
ring. For example, most of the agricultural bankers 
surveyed by the American Bankers Association in mid-
1985 reported getting requests for refinancing from FCS 
borrowers, and one of the main reasons given for those 
requests was the farmers' concern that FCS stock "might 
not be recoverable" (Herr 1985, p. 6). On average, banks 
reporting such requests received 13 of them, but granted 
only 2 or 3—presumably those of financially healthy 
FCS borrowers. 
Despite reports that concern about taking losses on% 
FCS stock is driving some financially strong farmers out 
of the system, the number of FCS borrowers who have 
actually lost money on their stock remains very small. 
Therefore, skeptics might wonder whether farmers' wor-
ries about this stock significantly affect their decisions 
about where to borrow. Such skeptics must acknowledge, 
though, that the system's farm loan portfolio has declined 
in size and quality recently, and they might even agree 
that the decline has been greater among FCS co-ops than 
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among farm banks. They could still counter, however, 
that most of the decline in the system's portfolio has 
probably been caused by other factors—the lost size, by 
the overall decline in farm borrowing, the increase in 
federal government farm lending, and the more competi-
tive interest rates offered by farm banks; the lost quality, 
by that rate competition and, mostly, by the general 
depression of farm income and asset values. 
Here I won't try to either support or rebut these 
skeptical views. I agree that much, and perhaps most, of 
the decline in the system's farm loan portfolio can be 
explained without regard to the risk of loss on FCS stock. 
Furthermore, even rough estimates of how much this risk 
has actually risen and thus contributed to the decline in 
the system's portfolio depend on factors that I will not 
analyze in depth, such as the size of FCS capital reserves 
and problem loans, their distribution among FCS co-ops 
and the workability of arrangements to share them among 
co-ops, the federal government's willingness to extend 
financial aid to the system, and farmers' views of the 
riskiness of co-op stock. What I will do here is demon-
strate that the FCS portfolio has in fact declined with 
farmers' fortunes recently and try to explain in detail both 
how an increase in the riskiness of FCS stock has played 
at least a small part in reinforcing the decline and how its 
role could be larger under certain circumstances. That 
possibility raises the question of how the system's 
portfolio declines should be responded to by the FCS, its 
regulators, and the federal government (which recently 
established procedures to aid this commercial lender). I 
will therefore conclude by explaining why that is a diffi-
cult question, one involving the fundamental issue of how 
risk is shared in these co-ops. 
The Fortunes of Farmers 
and Their Lenders 
The basic business of the FCS is to sell its securities in the 
money market and lend the proceeds to its stockholders, 
or members, who are mostly farmers. In the 1970s that 
business was prosperous, and the FCS was able to 
significantly enlarge its loan portfolio with apparently no 
serious increase in problem loans. In the 1980s, however, 
the system's business soured, as depressed prices for farm 
products and assets led to widespread losses on agri-
cultural loans. Partly as a result, the FCS portfolio of 
farm loans declined in size and quality. 
A Network of Farm Lending Co-ops 
As a group, U.S. farmers are big borrowers. At the end of 
1985, they collectively owed $194 billion, much more 
than the foreign debts of well known borrowing countries 
like Argentina or Brazil (Melichar, forthcoming).
1 A bit 
more than half of this debt consists of loans secured by 
first mortgages on farm real estate. Non-real estate debt is 
backed primarily by nonland physical capital (equipment 
or livestock, for example), the debtor's capacity to 
generate income (from either farm assets or off-farm 
employment), and second and third mortgages on farm 
real estate. Besides their individual businesses, farmers 
also own many agricultural processing and marketing co-
ops, which are also deeply in debt (Ginder, Stone, and 
Otto, undated). 
Again, farmers' single biggest source of credit is the 
FCS. At the end of 1985, it held $61 billion, or almost 
one-third, of their debt (Melichar, forthcoming). The 
FCS provides both real estate and non-real estate credit 
to both farmers and farm co-ops across the nation. It is 
divided along functional and geographic lines, with 
separate real estate, non-real estate, and farm co-op 
lending organizations in each of 12 FCS districts. (See 
the accompanying chart.) 
Farm real estate lending is the system's primary 
activity. Each of the 12 FCS districts has a Federal Land 
Bank to make loans, mostly to farmers, that are secured 
by first mortgages on farm and rural real estate. The land 
banks operate through hundreds of local Federal Land 
Bank Associations that process and provide advice on 
farmers' loans. As of December 1985, the 12 land banks 
held over $45 billion in real estate loans to farmers, or 
about 74 percent of the system's total farm loan portfolio 
and 42 percent of farmers' total real estate debt (Melichar, 
forthcoming). 
All of these FCS real estate lenders are directly or 
indirectly borrower-owned co-ops. To get a mortgage 
from a Federal Land Bank, a farmer typically agrees to 
use 5 percent of the loan to buy nontransferable voting 
stock in the farmer's local Federal Land Bank Associa-
tion. That association then buys an equal amount of stock 
in the district's land bank, which entitles the association's 
directors to participate in the election of the FCS district 
board of directors. 
Non-real estate lending to farmers is the system's 
second biggest activity, and it, too, is done by borrower-
owned co-ops. FCS non-real estate loans are both 
processed and made primarily at the local level by 
hundreds of Production Credit Associations. The associa-
tions in each FCS district get most of the funds they lend 
by borrowing from the district's Federal Intermediate 
1 At least 10 percent of the debt I am attributing to farmers is actually held by 
farm landlords rather than active farmers. 
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Credit Bank. Borrowers from a Production Credit As-
sociation must buy an amount of nontransferable voting 
stock in the association equal to at least 5 percent (and 
often 10 percent) of their loan, and that association then 
buys stock in its district intermediate credit bank and can 
participate in the election of the FCS district board. As of 
December 1985, the Production Credit Associations 
held $15 billion in non-real estate loans to farmers, or 
about 25 percent of the system's total farm loan portfolio 
and 17 percent of farmers' total non-real estate debt, 
excluding price support loans (Melichar, forthcoming). 
The FCS also lends to other farm co-ops and to non-
farmers and nonfarm businesses (including banks) in 
rural areas. In each FCS district, the loans to other farm 
co-ops are made by the district Bank for Cooperatives 
and the national Central Bank for Cooperatives. 
All the FCS banks fund their loans mainly through the 
sale of bonds and notes to investors worldwide. The sale 
of these securities is managed by the Federal Farm Credit 
Banks Funding Corporation, which acts as the system's 
fiscal agent. The FCS raises most of its funds through the 
sale of Federal Farm Credit Banks Consolidated System-
wide Bonds. This form of funding is supplemented by 
Federal Farm Credit Banks Consolidated Systemwide 
Notes, which are the system's main means of flexible 
short-term (less than one year) funding. The funds 
obtained through the sale of these bonds and notes are 
distributed among the FCS banks. Each bank has the 
primary responsibility for meeting its share of the sched-
uled interest and principal payments on the systemwide 
bonds and notes, but these securities are ultimately 
backed by the combined financial resources of all the 
banks. (FCS securities are not obligations of or guaran-
teed by the U.S. government.) At the end of 1984, 
outstanding balances of about $62 billion in systemwide 
bonds and $5 billion in systemwide notes accounted for 
about 82 and 7 percent, respectively, of the system's total 
liabilities (FCS 1985a, p. 24). 
Although FCS district banks and local co-op associa-
tions retain considerable autonomy, a certain degree of 
nationwide supervision is required by law. All the 
system's banks are chartered by the U.S. government and 
now operate under the provisions of the Farm Credit Act 
of 1971, as amended. Under the most recent amend-
ments, which take effect in January 1986, the nationwide 
policies and regulations that govern the FCS are set by 
the Farm Credit Administration Board, whose three 
members are appointed by the President. Enforcement of 
the board's policies and regulations and the financial 
examination of FCS banks and associations are the 
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responsibility of an independent agency in the executive 
branch of the government, the Farm Credit Administra-
tion. (For a summary of the major provisions of the recent 
amendments, see the accompanying box.) 
Prosperity and Growth in the 1970s 
Because the FCS is almost exclusively a farm lender, its 
financial condition is closely linked to that of its farm 
borrower-owners. As growth in farmers' income and 
wealth accelerated in the 1970s, the entire farm lending 
business expanded too. A variety of factors helped the 
FCS capture a growing share of this growing market with 
apparently no serious deterioration in the quality of its 
loan portfolio. 
Real (inflation-adjusted) farm income grew moderate-
ly in the 1960s and then jumped in the 1970s. Most of the 
jump was due to the increased earning power of farmland 
and other farm assets. That increase was fueled mostly by 
strong growth in the worldwide demand for the products 
they were needed to produce. 
As the earning power of farm assets increased, so did 
farmers' willingness to bid for them. The result was rapid 
growth in farm asset prices and thus in farm wealth and 
debt. The real value of farm real estate began accelerating 
in 1972; by 1980 it was 80 percent higher than in 1970 
(USDA 1984, Table 81).
2 The real value of all farm 
assets also rose 80 percent in the 1970s and caught up 
with income from these assets (Melichar 1985 a, Table 
101). At the same time, the real value of farm debt rose 70 
percent, as farmers borrowed to expand their operations 
(Melichar, forthcoming). With real capital gains on farm 
assets totaling over $500 billion and the growth in farm 
asset values outstripping the growth in farm debt, real 
farm equity grew 82 percent between 1970 and 1980 
(Melichar 1985a, Tables 112 and 101). 
The real value of farm debt held by the FCS grew even 
more in that decade: 127 percent (Melichar, forthcoming). 
This rapid growth boosted the FCS share of the farm real 
estate loan market more than 10 percentage points, from 
23 percent in 1970 to 35 percent in 1980 (Melichar 
1985a, Table 521). Its share of the market for farm non-
real estate loans (excluding price support loans) ex-
panded more moderately—from 23 to 25 percent. This 
gain is still impressive, though, considering that expanded 
government lending in the period helped cut the market 
share of all commercial lenders (banks plus the FCS) 
from 71 to 66 percent of non-real estate farm loans 
(Melichar 1985a, Table 531). 
According to its financial statements, the FCS man-
aged to significantly increase its lending in the 1970s 
without seriously decreasing the quality of its loans. At 
Federal Land Banks, for example, loan losses equaled 
only 0.0003 percent of average outstanding loans in 
1971-76 (FCS 1977, p. 5). In the two years after a 
temporary fall in farm income in 1976, this loss rate 
climbed as high as 0.025 and 0.008 percent (FCS 1977, 
1978), but even these rates were far below the 0.2 and 0.3 
percent rates typical on all loans at agricultural banks in 
the 1970s (Melichar 1984, Table E.l). In 1979-80, after 
the farm economy had recovered from its mid-decade 
recession, the levels of the land banks' loan losses were 
actually negative [collections on loans previously written 
off as uncollectible exceeded new write-offs (FCS 1980, 
1981)]. 
Several factors helped the FCS expand and safeguard 
its farm loan portfolio in the 1970s. The overall expan-
sion in farm borrowing, coupled with generally high farm 
income and rapid appreciation of farm assets, accounts 
for much of the growth and safety in 1970s farm lending 
generally. Other factors may explain the increase in the 
system's market share. One is an increase in the lending 
authority of Federal Land Banks: the Farm Credit Act of 
1971 allowed these banks to lend up to 85 percent of the 
purchase price of farm real estate, instead of the previous 
limit of 65 percent of conservatively appraised value. 
Another factor is the competitive interest rates the FCS 
charged in the 1970s. The FCS typically used an av-
erage-cost-of-funds formula to set interest rates. Since 
interest rates generally trended upward in the 1970s and 
the system's liabilities were primarily intermediate- and 
long-term, this formula led the FCS to set rates that 
commercial banks found hard to match. Still another 
factor in the market share increase may be the system's 
routine access to national money markets. In the 1970s, 
interest rates in those markets pushed against the maxi-
mum rates banks were allowed to pay on deposits. Partly 
because of that, deposits at rural banks grew more slowly 
than their loans, particularly in 1976-79. Funding further 
loans then required attracting funds through nondeposit 
liabilities, an activity at which the FCS may have been 
more efficient. 
Interest rate movements may also have boosted the 
quality of the FCS farm loan portfolio in the 1970s. 
Because the FCS generally charged the same rate to all its 
2 Some of the data on farm assets and debt I refer to in this paper were adjusted 
for inflation by me, using the Commerce Department's personal consumption 
expenditures deflator. Most of the annual data so adjusted are for December 31 or 
January 1 and were deflated by the average level of the deflator in the adjacent 
fourth and first quarters. Land values are measured in February or April and were 
deflated by the first quarter deflator. Quarterly data were deflated by the 
corresponding quarter's deflator. 
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3 banks might 
have tended to compete by offering interest rates compar-
able to the system's but only to borrowers better than the 
average FCS borrower.
4 To the extent that rising interest 
rates drove an increasing wedge between the cost of funds 
for banks and for the FCS, banks may have had to restrict 
their lending to a narrower and narrower group of farmers. 
This would tend to raise the average quality of the 
system's loans, as it came to dominate better and better 
segments of the market. 
Depression and Decline in the 1980s 
Farmers' gains turned to losses in the first half of the 
1980s, an experience that ranks among the worst re-
versals in American agricultural history. Real farm 
income, asset values, and debt all peaked and fell in this 
period. Many of the factors that boosted FCS lending in 
the 1970s were reversed too. As a result, after 1982, FCS 
farm lending fell faster than total farm lending and the 
quality of the system's loan portfolio deteriorated sig-
nificantly. 
Two of the sharpest declines on farmers' financial 
statements came in two categories: the income attribut-
able to farm assets and the cash flow remaining to farmers 
and landlords after payment of operating expenses and 
interest on debt. A comparison of the 1972-79 boom 
with the 1980-84 bust shows real average gross farm 
income down only about 6 percent. This moderate 
decline more than doubles when real noninterest operat-
ing expenses (which did not decline) are netted out: cash 
flow after payment of noninterest operating expenses fell 
about 14 percent. The decline more than doubles again 
after deductions of real depreciation (which rose in the 
1980s) and real returns attributable to operators' labor 
and management (which fell less than cash flow after 
noninterest expenses). The residual—real income attrib-
utable to farm assets—fell an extraordinary 36 percent. 
Alternatively, if real interest payments (which rose 80 
percent due to a rise in debt and interest rates) are 
deducted, the result is roughly a 31 percent decline in cash 
flow after interest and noninterest expenses (Melichar 
1985a, Tables 112 and 122). 
As the income earned by farm assets fell in the 1980s, 
so did the value of those assets. Nationwide, the real value 
of farm real estate fell 32 percent from 1980 to 1985 
(USDA 1984, Table 81; 1985a, Table 1), and by the 
beginning of 1985, the real value of all farm assets was 
about 28 percent below its peak five years earlier 
(Melichar 1985 a, Table 411). In many parts of the 
country, the declines were even steeper. 
Falling income and asset values together made many 
farm loans unpayable and uncollectible. In 1985, even 
with off-farm sources of income, over 200,000 farms did 
not generate enough cash to cover both interest payments 
and typical family living expenses (USDA 1985b, p. iii). 
Among small commercial banks with large farm loan 
portfolios, loan losses ballooned from between 0.2 and 
0.3 percent of outstanding loans in the 1970s to 1.2 
percent in 1984, and they appeared to be expanding 
further in 1985 (Melichar 1984, Table E. 1; 1985b, Table 
11). 
Problems in paying off and collecting on farm loans 
eventually led both farmers and their lenders to reduce 
farmers' indebtedness somewhat. Real farm debt con-
tinued to expand through 1981, partly because some 
farmers' first reactions to the decline in their income was 
to extend and refinance their loans. Since then billions of 
dollars of farm loans have been either paid down or 
written off as indebted farmers have tried to reduce their 
debt or have gone out of business. At the same time, 
farmers and their lenders have been more cautious about 
taking on new debt. As a result, by the end of 1985, real 
farm debt had dropped 12 percent below its peak at the 
end of 1981 (Melichar, forthcoming). 
FCS lending declined more than that. By the end of 
1985, the real value of the system's total farm loan 
portfolio was down about 19 percent from 1981. Most of 
the decline was in non-real estate loans; they were down 
37 percent. But FCS real estate loans were also down, 9 
percent. The system's share of all farm loans (excluding 
price support loans) fell from its peak value of 34 percent 
in 1982 to about 31 percent at the end of 1985 (Melichar, 
forthcoming). 
The slippage in the quality of FCS loans was even 
more dramatic. Net loan losses in just the first nine 
months of 1985 exceeded 0.4 percent of average loans 
outstanding, far more than the miniscule loss rates of the 
1970s. Furthermore, the system's financial statement for 
the third quarter of 1985 states that the FCS banks "may 
be exposed to loan losses aggregating $3.0 billion or more 
[over 4 percent of September 1985 loan volume] during 
the 1985-1987 period" (FCS 1985b, p. 12). These 
3A notable exception is the system's New England district (headquartered in 
Springfield, Massachusetts), where FCS lenders have for many years charged 
higher interest rates to riskier borrowers. 
4The logic behind this view is that no one who could qualify for an FCS loan 
would be willing to pay more for a bank loan. Banks would thus have to match the 
system's effective rate for all borrowers except those too risky for FCS credit 
(whom banks could either charge a higher rate or, perhaps more likely, refer to the 
government's Farmers Home Administration loan programs). But since the cost of 
funds was higher for banks, they couldn't afford to offer this rate to the full range of 
FCS borrowers and would instead have to limit it to the least risky borrowers. 
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potential losses have raised questions about the solvency 
of the FCS and helped push up the interest rates it must 
pay in order to sell its bonds. 
A reversal of many of the factors that helped the FCS 
loan portfolio grow in the 1970s contributed to its decline 
in the 1980s. The decline in the volume of FCS farm 
lending partly reflects the overall decline in farm loans 
outstanding (including many unpaid loans that lenders 
partially or totally wrote off). However, special factors 
are again needed to account for the change in the system's 
market share. A surge of farm lending by the federal 
government is one factor. Excluding price support loans, 
federal farm lending rose from 10 percent of total farm 
lending at the end of 1979 to over 14 percent at the end of 
1985 (Melichar, forthcoming). (When price support 
loans are included, the federal share rose from 13 to 21 
percent over that period.) Falling interest rates in national 
money markets are another important reason for the 
recent decline. They reduced banks' marginal cost of 
funds, bringing it closer to the system's long-term average 
cost and thus narrowing the spread between farm loan 
interest rates at banks and FCS co-ops. In addition, as 
loan growth generally slowed and fell behind deposit 
growth and banks gained both experience and more 
regulatory freedom, their problems in obtaining funds for 
ag lending greatly eased, making them better able to 
compete with the FCS for borrowers. The decline in the 
quality of FCS loans is primarily due to the generally 
reduced farm income and asset values. However, the 
more competitive interest rates may have been a factor in 
this as well, because the borrowers best able to leave the 
system and get bank credit at these more competitive 
rates are the financially strongest. 
The Stock Factor 
Although other factors probably account for most of the 
growth and decline in the FCS farm loan portfolio, the 
risks and rewards of being a stockholder (as well as a 
borrower) in this system are probably responsible too. 
The return on co-op stock is part of the effective cost of 
borrowing from the FCS. By increasing the chances that 
the value of FCS stock will fall, the agricultural depres-
sion of the 1980s reduced this return and helped raise the 
cost of FCS loans. And any increase in the cost of these 
loans tends to reduce both their amount and quality 
(assuming, of course, that other interest rates don't 
change).
5 Overall, the increased risk of loss on stock may 
have affected the system's loan portfolio only a bit, but in 
some co-ops it may have been, and still may be, much 
more important. 
Complicating the Cost of Borrowing 
In a plain, no-strings-attached loan, the total cost of the 
borrowed funds can be thought of quite simply, as the 
interest rate times the amount of cash the borrower 
obtains.
6 The cost of funds borrowed from the FCS is not 
as easily computed, for they have an important string 
attached: an FCS borrower must agree to buy at least one 
$5 share of FCS stock for every $100 borrowed.
7 The 
borrower cannot sell the stock and remain a borrower. 
Upon either repayment of the principal of the loan or 
liquidation of the co-op, the borrower's stock is redeemed, 
that is, sold back to the co-op.
8 The price the borrower 
receives is either the original price (par value) of $5 per 
share or the stock's current book value (co-op assets 
minus liabilities, divided by the number of shares), 
whichever is less. 
Because FCS borrowers must also be stockholders, 
the annual cost of borrowing from an FCS co-op reflects 
the return on the co-op's stock as well as the interest cost. 
In fact, the total cost of this borrowing can be decomposed 
into the interest cost of a plain loan less the return on the 
stock that must be held to obtain that loan, or 
Total cost of borrowing = Effective interest cost 
— Return on stock. 
For most borrowers, the effective interest component 
is slightly complicated by the difference between the 
principal of the loan and the amount of cash the borrower 
5 The effects of the riskiness of FCS stock on the system's loan portfolio can 
be viewed as feedback effects that reinforce the decline in its portfolio. That is, the 
decline in the portfolio is the primary factor and explains why FCS stock is now 
riskier to own. But that increased risk aggravates the decline in the size and quality 
of the portfolio. 
6 He re I will analyze the cost of borrowing money for one year only, rather 
than compute a present value of the cost of borrowing in all future years. In effect, 
I'm assuming that all farm loans are for exactly one year, that each year borrowers 
and lenders negotiate completely new loans, with borrowers only concerned about 
getting the best terms for the coming year and lenders only concerned about 
accurately evaluating borrowers' financial conditions during that year. This one-
year analysis is strictly valid only under the assumption that switching lenders 
involves no transaction costs or penalties (for example, penalties for prepaying 
long-term loans). Farm borrowers do face at least some such costs, but these costs 
don't seem large enough to invalidate my analysis. For example, FCS co-ops 
generally have not formally differentiated between borrowers based on whether 
they have been faithful or fickle customers. 
7 This is not unlike the arrangement at many banks in which some borrowers 
are at least expected, if not required, to also purchase a bank asset, generally a 
deposit paying a low rate of return. 
8Production Credit Associations have tended to redeem a borrower's stock 
steadily, in proportion to the repayment of principal. Federal Land Banks have 
tended to delay redemption until much or even all of the principal has been repaid, 
and Production Credit Associations in the system's Omaha district have recently 
adopted this procedure. Co-op liquidations have been rare. In fact, between 1938 
and 1983 only one co-op was liquidated, in 1972 (U.S. Congress 1985). 
19 actually obtains (after also buying stock). For example, if 
borrowers want the use of $C from the FCS, the stated 
amount of their loan must be higher. The difference can be 
thought of as extra borrowings used to buy FCS stock.
9 
The total interest cost of the $C obtained is most directly 
computed from the stated amount of the loan, or 
Effective interest cost = [(1 + r)/( 1 - s)]C 
where r is the stated loan interest rate, [ l/( 1 — s)]C is the 
stated loan amount, and s is the proportion of the stated 
loan amount which must be used to buy co-op stock. ( The 
amount of stock bought is thus [s/( 1 — s)]C.) Alternative-
ly, since (1 + r)/(l - s) = 1 + [(s + r)/( 1 - s)]9 the in-
terest cost can be viewed as resulting from an effective 
interest rate of (s + r)/( 1 — s) applied to the cash actually 
obtained, $C. 
The borrowing cost's return on stock component itself 
decomposes into the difference between dividends and 
capital losses. If d is dividends per dollar of stock held at 
the beginning of the year, then annual dividends are d 
times total stock held then, or d[s/( 1 — s)]C. Dividends, 
of course, are never negative. IfL is the annual percentage 
decline in the redemption price of co-op stock, then 
capital losses are L times total stock, orL[s/(l — ^)]C. 
Capital losses also may be zero or positive but never 
negative. That is, no one realizes gains on co-op stock 
because it is always purchased (from the co-op) at par and 
always sold (back to the co-op) at par or less (as when a 
liquidated co-op turns out to have a subpar book value). 
The total annual return on stock is, then, 
Return on stock = (d - L)[s/(1 - s)]C. 
The return on stock component further complicates 
the computation of the cost of FCS borrowing by 
introducing uncertainty. The interest cost is known when 
the borrowing decision is made, but the return on stock is 
not. This means that profit-maximizing farmers will 
evaluate FCS loans based on the expected total cost of 
borrowing, which is the effective interest cost, as given 
above, minus the expected return on stock: 
Expected return on stock=E(d—L )[s/( 1 — s)]C 
where E(d — L) is the margin between the dividends and 
V 
^Though typical, this situation is not universal. A small percentage of 
borrowers pay interest to the FCS only on the $C because they pay for their stock 
with funds not borrowed from the FCS. 
A New Law for the Farm Credit System 
In December 1985, Congress passed and President Reagan 
signed the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 (Public 
Law 99-205). This new law is designed to financially 
strengthen the Farm Credit System (FCS) without exces-
sively burdening either its borrowers or the nation's tax-
payers. The law primarily establishes new procedures for 
handling the system's loan losses, standardizes the regula-
tion and examination of FCS lenders, clarifies and extends 
the rights of FCS borrowers, and mandates a 1986 study of 
U.S. agricultural credit markets. 
Self-Help 
Under the old legislation, a cumbersome procedure had to be 
followed for a financially healthy FCS lender to help a 
troubled one. The new law creates a new Farm Credit 
System Capital Corporation with broad powers to arrange 
financial aid packages within the system (Title I, Sees. 103, 
104).
1 The Capital Corporation can provide funds to FCS 
banks and associations through loans, purchases of their 
stock, or outright contributions. At the request of a troubled 
FCS lender or as a condition for financial aid, the Capital 
Corporation can purchase problem assets (nonaccrual loans 
or repossessed properties) "at fair market value" (Sec. 103). 
In managing these assets, it can renegotiate the terms of 
loans, sell property, and take action against borrowers. To 
cover its operating expenses it can assess FCS lenders, and 
to fund its financial aid packages it can require healthy FCS 
lenders to contribute or lend to it or buy its stock. In so doing, 
however, the Capital Corporation cannot force these lenders 
to draw on their stock or loan loss reserves, and it must not 
weaken them to the point that they could not provide credit to 
"eligible borrowers on reasonable and competitive terms" 
(Sec. 103).
2 
To prevent the Capital Corporation from evolving into a 
nationwide agricultural bank, its authority is expressly 
directed toward helping the FCS through its current diffi-
culties. The corporation's authority to initiate financial aid 
packages expires on December 31, 1990. 
Federal Help 
The old law severely limited the financial aid that the federal 
government could offer troubled FCS lenders. The new law 
relaxes those limits somewhat by allowing federal aid to be 
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channeled through the Capital Corporation (Title I, Sec. 
103). Under certain conditions, the Secretary of the Treasury 
is authorized (but not required) to purchase obligations of the 
corporation, up to an amount appropriated by Congress. The 
conditions are basically that 
• The FCS needs "financial assistance to address finan-
cial stress" of its lenders. 
•The system has already "committed" its surplus capital 
(all but its members' stock) and loan loss reserves "to 
address" that stress. 
•"The salaries and benefits of the senior executive of-
ficers" of FCS banks have been frozen. 
•The FCS has used its surplus capital and loan loss re-
serves to the extent that further contributions or loan 
losses will likely prevent system lenders "from making 
credit available to eligible borrowers on reasonable 
terms." 
Regulation 
Previously the Farm Credit Administration faced a potential 
conflict of interest because it both regulated and helped 
manage the FCS. Furthermore, this agency lacked some 
powers of other financial regulators. The new law makes the 
agency a more independent and powerful regulator (Title II). 
The new law separates the Farm Credit Administration 
from the Farm Credit System. The agency's new board will 
be appointed by the President, with no formal input from the 
FCS. The agency will give up its management responsibili-
ties and concentrate on regulating the FCS. 
The new law strengthens the Farm Credit Administra-
tion as a regulator by giving it some powers similar to those of 
the Federal Reserve System and the Comptroller of the 
Currency. To enforce its regulations, the agency now can 
issue cease and desist orders to FCS lenders and managers 
and remove managers who violate those orders. It can 
arrange mergers for failing FCS banks and associations and 
appoint receivers to liquidate them. It (rather than the FCS) 
now directly examines all FCS lenders and must require 
them all to have their annual financial statements audited by 
an independent auditor. It sets standards for FCS financial 
performance, such as capital levels, interest rates on bonds 
and loans, and dividends and patronage refunds. 
Borrower Protection 
The financial stress shared by the FCS and its borrowers has 
sometimes led to grievances. The new law tries to address 
some borrowers' complaints by mandating that the FCS 
offer its customers more information and that the FCS and 
its regulator develop new procedures for reaching credit 
decisions (Title III). 
For loans not already covered by the Truth in Lending 
Act, FCS lenders must now tell borrowers more about the 
interest rate as well as the amount, frequency, and criteria by 
which variable interest rates may change. To clarify the 
effects of FCS stock ownership, the system must also 
disclose "the effect, as shown by a representative example or 
examples, of the required purchase of stock ... on the 
effective rate of interest" (Sec. 301b). 
In addition, new procedures must be established for 
handling farmers with credit problems. The Farm Credit 
Administration must provide FCS lenders with a written 
policy on the standards its examiners will use to judge the 
soundness of their loans. FCS lenders must set up semi-
independent review committees to which farmers who are 
denied credit can appeal. 
A Study 
Finally, the new law suggests that further changes in the 
nation's farm lending system are not far away. The law (Title 
V) creates a National Commission on Agricultural Finance, 
consisting of 15 volunteers that represent "the financial 
community, the agricultural sector, and government" (Sec. 
501a). The commission is to study "methods to ensure the 
availability of adequate credit to agricultural producers and 
agribusiness, taking into account the long-term financing 
needs of the agricultural economy; the roles of the commer-
cial banks, the Farm Credit System, and the Farmers Home 
Administration" (Sec. 501b). By the end of 1986, the 
commission must report to Congress the results of its study 
and its "recommendations for legislation providing for a 
sound, reasonable, and primarily self-supporting credit 
program for farmers" (Sec. 501 d). 
1 The legislation terminates a much weaker Farm Credit System Capital 
Corporation. 
2Accounting principles should prevent healthy FCS lenders from pad-
ding their loan loss reserves in order to evade contributions to the Capital 
Corporation. 
21 the losses per dollar of stock that the borrower expects in 
the coming year. 
An increase in the chances of a loss on FCS stock 
raises the expected total cost of borrowing from the FCS. 
It does this by increasing the size ofis(L), the percentage 
loss that FC S borrowers expect in the coming year on the 
co-op stock they must own. That reduces the expected 
return on FCS stock and raises the total cost of an FCS 
loan. 
Increasing Risk 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the expected return on FCS 
stock was probably small but positive. In those years, the 
system's considerable capital surplus and record of only 
minor loan losses probably made the chances that a co-op 
would be liquidated at less than par seem remote. 
Therefore, the expected return on stock was approxi-
mately just expected dividends, or E(d)[s/(l — s)]C. 
From 1976 to 1982, actual dividends paid by FCS banks 
(including stock as well as cash dividends) ranged 
between 0.30 and 0.44 percent of average outstanding 
loans (FCS 1977-83). In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
expected dividends were probably also within that range, 
so the expected return on stock probably offset between 
0.3 and 0.4 of a percentage point of the effective interest 
cost of borrowing from FCS co-ops. 
Recently, though, the expected return on FCS stock 
has almost certainly declined. Dividends have fallen from 
their peak values. In both 1983 and 1984, they equaled 
about 0.25 percent of loans outstanding (FCS 1984, 
1985 a), and with the system expecting to post large 
operating losses in 1985, dividends will probably fall 
further. Besides that, the system's deteriorating financial 
condition seems to make the chances of losses on FCS 
stock less remote. Since mid-1983,11 Production Credit 
Associations have entered liquidation. For at least 4 of 
these, the district Federal Intermediate Credit Bank 
provided the funds to redeem borrowers' stock at par, but 
that may not happen for the others. By mid-1985, the 
magnitude of loan losses already incurred and still likely 
in the Omaha and Spokane districts helped prod other 
FCS banks into agreements to transfer funds to those two 
districts. By October 1985, billions of dollars in system-
wide operating and loan losses were projected for 1985— 
87, and since January the surplus capital of the FCS 
banks had slipped from 5.3 to 5.1 percent of their loan 
volume (FCS 1985b). Partly in response, in December 
1985, legislation was enacted to ease the transfer of 
capital from stronger to weaker FCS co-ops and to 
authorize (but not mandate) government financial aid to 
the system under certain circumstances (again, see 
box)—but even this apparently does not preclude capital 
losses by FCS shareholders. 
The actual level of a borrower's expected loss on FCS 
stock depends on the expected decline in the redemption 




 For the extreme case where a total loss 
in the coming year (liquidation with stock redeemed at a 
zero price) appears certain, the loss would be equivalent 
to [s/(l — j
1)] 100 percentage points of interest on the 
borrowed cash. (Recall that s indicates the amount of 
stock held per dollar of loan principal and the principal of 
an FCS loan equals cash borrowed plus stock purchased.) 
Since, according to system rules, s is at least 0.05 (and 
may be higher), this would add at least 5.2 percentage 
points to the effective cost of borrowing. Even a 10 per-
cent chance of such a total loss would add at least 0.52 of 
a percentage point to that cost, enough to exceed the peak 
rate of dividends and thus probably make the expected 
return on stock negative. 
Estimating this return more precisely is not easy 
because it varies among individuals and because the 
system's future financial condition and access to govern-
ment aid are uncertain. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the return is somewhat lower than just a 
few years ago and that its decline has raised the effective 
cost of borrowing from the FCS. By so doing, it has made 
at least a small contribution to the general decline in the 
size and quality of the system's farm loan portfolio. 
The contribution may be more than small, however. 
Two possible reasons are farmers' attitudes toward risk 
and toward their co-ops' financial accounts. 
The expected return on FCS stock may have fallen 
only slightly, but even a slight decline could sharply 
change the behavior of farmers who are very reluctant to 
take risks. This is because such farmers worry about more 
than their expected profits. Unlike the profit-maximizing 
farmers discussed above, these risk-averse farmers highly 
value behavior that reduces the chance that actual profits 
will turn out to be less than expected, and they are even 
willing to reduce their expected profits somewhat in order 
to reduce their risk. An increase in the chance of a loss on 
FCS co-op stock thus hits these farmers in two ways. The 
greater chance of a loss not only reduces the expected 
return on co-op stock and therefore the borrowers' 
expected profits; it also raises the risk that actual profits 
will fall below even that lower level. Measuring only the 
decline in the expected return on co-op stock thus 
1
0
 Algebraically the expected loss is given by setting the dividend term d to zero 
in the equation for the expected return on stock and changing the sign of the 
resulting expression. 
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understates the increase in these farmers' desire to obtain 
a less risky source of credit. The greater their aversion to 
risk, the greater the degree of this understatement. 
Another source of understatement is farmers' views of 
their co-ops' books. In analyzing the expected return on 
FCS stock, I mainly used official financial statements for 
the system as a whole. However, these systemwide 
statements may seriously understate the risk perceived by 
stockholders in some FCS co-ops. This could happen 
because a co-op's financial statements are accurate but 
either weaker than the systemwide average or simply not 
believed by the co-op's stockholders. It could also happen 
because a co-op's financial statements are overly optimis-
tic. In fact, some think that is true: The FCS has recently 
been accused of being slow to officially recognize the 
problems in its farm loan portfolio and reduce the value of 
the assets (mainly farm loans) shown on its books 
(McCoy 1985a; McCoy and Bailey 1985; Dahlman, 
Rinkey, and Silverman 1985). 
Such a delay can create strong incentives to leave the 
co-op. Any delay in reducing the book value of a co-op's 
loans merely creates a backlog that is likely to be reduced 
eventually. This decreases the odds of a loss on co-op 
stock today but at the cost of increasing those odds 
tomorrow. If the co-op's borrowers think its accounting 
has lagged in this way, they may foresee a great risk to 
their stock if the accounts suddenly catch up with reality. 
In the meantime, the accounting lag probably means that 
the co-op still values and hence redeems its stock at par. 
Borrowers can therefore avoid what may seem like almost 
inevitable large losses on their co-op stock by quickly 
paying off their co-op loans and redeeming their stock at 
par. Once again, however, those most likely to be able to 
respond are the co-op's financially strongest borrowers. 
So, by building up the potential for sudden large loan 
losses, the accounting delays could have made return on 
co-op stock a major factor in the decline in the size and 
quality of some co-ops' loan portfolios. 
What to Do? 
A deteriorating farm loan portfolio has hurt the FCS 
financially. Considering new loan pricing strategies is an 
obvious way to try to prevent further losses. However, 
this might mean moving away from the co-op tradition of 
treating all members alike. That possibility suggests that 
risk-sharing in the FCS may be—and may have to be— 
unequal. 
A declining loan portfolio can make a financial 
institution like the FCS less profitable. The lower volume 
of lending makes covering its overhead costs more 
difficult. The lower quality of loans makes loan losses 
more likely and raises the cost of managing the loans. For 
the FCS, both of these effects are especially unwelcome 
now that the cost of the funds it borrows from bondholders 
has become more sensitive to its financial prospects. In 
1985, the interest rate premium demanded by FCS 
bondholders (relative to the rate on comparable U.S. 
Treasury debt) rose steeply, from 0.1 of a percentage 
point to more than 1 percentage point (Taylor 1985). 
Costlier funds, of course, cut into FCS profits. 
One strategy for restoring a co-op's profits is to 
uniformly raise the interest rates it charges borrowers. A 
danger in this strategy, of course, is that it might simply 
lead the co-op's stronger borrowers to find other lenders, 
thereby further reducing the volume and quality of the co-
op's farm loans. For that reason this strategy is more of an 
option for Federal Land Banks than for Production Credit 
Associations. The land banks' longstanding domination 
of the market for farm real estate credit may mean that 
other farm mortgage lenders—banks, life insurance com-
panies, and individuals—are not now ready or willing to 
refinance much of the land banks' large pool of good 
mortgages. The danger to the credit associations in the 
non-real estate credit market is greater because commer-
cial banks dominate that market and can rapidly expand 
their market share. 
To prevent strong borrowers from leaving, a co-op 
might consider instead uniformly lowering its rates to 
levels that would attract strong borrowers. The obvious 
problem with this strategy is that the lower interest rates 
may not cover expenses, especially on loans to the co-
op's weaker borrowers. If applied widely within the FCS, 
the strategy might even cause the system's bondholders to 
demand higher interest rates in compensation for its 
reduced earnings. 
A co-op intent on charging uniform interest rates to 
borrowers would probably do best to choose some middle 
course between these high and low interest rate strategies. 
However, some co-ops might want to move away from 
uniform rates by charging lower rates to the financially 




example, if strong borrowers expressed concern about 
taking losses on their co-op stock, the co-op could reduce 
their interest rates enough to offset their expected loss. At 
the same time it could continue to charge a higher rate to 
its more captive weaker borrowers. This strategy of 
differential pricing of loans would give the co-op's 
managers more flexibility in maintaining loan volume and 
1
1
 In fact, FCS lenders in the Omaha district have recentiy made arrangements 
to do this. 
23 quality without sacrificing current income. The strategy 
might even be extended to the co-op's existing long-term 
loans, those whose variable rates are adjusted annually to 
reflect the co-op's cost of funds. Since funding a sound 
loan costs less than funding a shaky loan, under this 
strategy the variable rates on old loans would be lower for 
strong than for weak borrowers. 
The potential exodus of strong FCS borrowers and the 
strategies for handling it ultimately focus attention on how 
risk is shared in FCS co-ops. When a co-op's loan losses 
lead to higher effective costs of borrowing from the co-op 
(through either higher interest charges or greater risk of a 
loss on co-op stock), stronger borrowers can escape the 
burden by either borrowing elsewhere or, under differen-
tial pricing, negotiating a special interest rate break from 
the co-op. As the stronger borrowers avoid the co-op's 
losses, the burden of these losses falls increasingly on the 
co-op's weaker borrowers, further weakening them and 
possibly also the co-op. This disparate sharing of risk 
among co-op members suggests that some broader in-
surance-like arrangement might be more efficient than the 
current system of FCS stockholding. 
Whether or not that is true is hard to say, though, for 
broader risk-sharing arrangements may not be workable. 
For example, if the co-op's potential borrowers knew 
which of them were most vulnerable to an agricultural 
downturn, the least vulnerable (the ones who would 
remain strong borrowers even after the downturn) might 
refuse to join the co-op unless arrangements were made 
for them to escape the burden of the weaker borrowers' 
losses. Absence of risk-sharing between strong and weak 
borrowers would then be a precondition for the existence 
of the co-op. Broad risk-sharing arrangements would be 
more likely if the potential borrowers did not know which 
of them were more vulnerable, but even then enforcing the 




efficient arrangement for the sharing of risk (and other 
costs) among FCS co-op members is a topic that deserves 
further research. 
12See Staatz 1985 for a general discussion of the problems in organizing 
cooperatives. 
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